Mandarin discrimination in Hong Kong: four mainland Chinese sojourn teachers' experience of symbolic violence

Yulong Li

Department of General Education,
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, City University of Macau,
Avenida Padre Tomás Pereira, Taipa, Macau SAR
E-mail address: marvinli@cityu.mo
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8341-9840

Daibo Xiao

Department of Cultural Industry Studies,
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
City University of Macau,
Avenida Padre Tomás Pereira, Taipa, Macau SAR
E-mail address: dbxiao@cityu.mo
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3743-7535

Abstract

Thesis. After the handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China in 1997, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government stipulated a trilingual (English, Cantonese, and Mandarin) and biliterate (English and Chinese) policy, in order to include Mandarin as an additional co-official language together with the original English and Cantonese. Until the handover, the use of Mandarin was restricted in British colonial Hong Kong. Since the handover, however, Mandarin and its users have experienced some resistance by local Hong Kong people.

Method. In an attempt to better understand this resistance and its implications, this study adopts Pierre Bourdieu's field, habitus, and capital theory, to analyse the anti-Mandarin discourse that has prevailed in the ensuing two decades. Via narrative inquiry, this study explains the habitus of four Mandarin speaking teachers, while especially noting their clashes with the anti-Mandarin discourse, and the symbolic violence they suffered in the field.

Conclusion. The study concludes with a reflection on the clash between the teachers' struggles with the discourse from a postcolonial perspective, and it also considers the legal issues involved in protecting mainland Chinese as a minority in Hong Kong.

Key words*:* Mandarin discrimination, symbolic violence, anti-colonialism, Hong Kong

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 regarding the handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China in 1997, the Hong Kong colonial government (henceforth, "the colonial government") and later the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government of The People's Republic of China (HKSAR government) gradually gave Mandarin (the official language of mainland China) an official capacity. For example, Mandarin was brought into the primary and secondary school curricula. Before 1984, the use of Mandarin in Hong Kong was very restricted (Wang & Kirkpatrick, 2015). In order to prepare for the handover, by 1989 there were 940 primary and 436 secondary school teachers training to teach Mandarin (Pierson, 1992). In another move to integrate Mandarin, by 1995, the Hong Kong civil service was required to use Mandarin as a functional working language.

The Linguistic Map of Hong Kong

As a former British colony, English has been Hong Kong's official language. Located in China's Pearl River Estuary, Hong Kong's majority population is made up of immigrants from nearby areas, where Cantonese is one of the major dialects; thus, Cantonese is the common spoken language of most Hong Kong people (Wang & Kirkpatrick, 2018), which simultaneously confirmed the status of Cantonese. However, not until 1974, did Chinese become the co-official language of Hong Kong (Bolton, 2011). Cantonese and Mandarin both belong to the Chinese language family and share a writing system, but they differ in terms of pronunciation, intonation, grammar and lexis (Pierson, 1992; Wang & Kirkpatrick, 2018), although traditional characters are used in Hong Kong while the simplified characters are used in the mainland

After the 1997 handover, the HKSAR government resolved to make Hong Kong a trilingual (English, Cantonese, and Mandarin) and biliterate (English and Chinese) society by stipulating a series of language policies, particularly to improve the status of Mandarin in education. So Mandarin is now a compulsory subject for students in their first nine years of schools, and schools are encouraged to use Mandarin as the medium of instruction in teaching the Chinese language (Wang & Kirkpatrick, 2018). Despite the government's effort in promoting Mandarin, years after' the policy enactment, Cantonese is still the major vernacular in mass media, the Legislative Council, popular culture, and people's communication; however, English still has an elite status and it is also the language of commerce and higher education, rendering little room for Mandarin to be used in the local context (Bolton, 2011).

Mandarin Meeting Challenges

Furthermore, with the increasingly common interactions between Mandarin speaking mainland Chinese (henceforth, "mainlanders") and the people of Hong Kong, increasing numbers of cases of resistance towards Mandarin have been reported. For example, some teachers have forbidden their students from

using Mandarin in school, except for in Mandarin lessons (Gu & Qu, 2015); Mandarin speakers are treated unfairly in everyday life (Gu & Tong, 2012; Ho, Ho, Wong, & Pau, 2014); some Hong Kong people claim Mandarin is unpleasant to the ear (Lowe & Tsang, 2017); Mandarin is also viewed as an assimilating tool of mainland China (Yu & Kwan, 2017). Recently, in a Hong Kong Legislative Council meeting, a legislator publicly interrupted and rejected a guest who was using Mandarin to make a presentation. The legislator said: "I think the presentation… is quite unnecessarily done in Putonghua (Mandarin). This is Hong Kong. We stick to, we tend to, at least, use English and then Cantonese" (Speakout, 2019, Jan, 17th). Mingyue Gu and Xiaoyuan Qu (2015) have stated that such a resistance to Mandarin in Hong Kong is because it is afflicted with a monoglot ideology, making the users of Mandarin feel "inferior" and subjected to the "superior" Cantonese and English users, rendering Mandarin speakers victims of symbolic violence.

Mandarin and Chinese Identity

Such a phenomenon raises concerns, but there has been little research explaining why Mandarin is not welcome in Hong Kong. Hong Kong, historically, geographically, and politically is a part of China, and more than half of its people are immigrants from China, many of whom are the children of those who evaded the Japanese invasion in the Second World War, the communist takeover of mainland China in 1949, or later the cultural revolution in the 1960s and 70s (Chan Lau, 1994; Tang, 1994; Young, 1994). Although most Hong Kong immigrants are from Cantonese speaking areas, some of these immigrants had Mandarin as their mother tongue; according to John Bacon-Shone and Kingsley Bolton (1998), the 1961 census on usual language used in Hong Kong reports that Mandarin users account for 0.9% of the population. Interestingly, with the arrival of the Mandarin speaking Shanghai elites in the 50s and 60s, entertainment followed in the form of Mandarin films and songs, making Mandarin a fashion and a respected language compared with Cantonese that average Hong Kong locals spoke (Yu & Kwan, 2017). Deeper into the past, those who immigrated to Hong Kong after 1909 should have had some recognition of Mandarin, as the late Qing Dynasty (1616-1912) appointed Mandarin as the official language of China, and the May the 4th Movement (an intellectual and student led patriotism movement against imperialism and feudalism) further legitimized the status of Mandarin in the Republic of China (1912-1949), connecting it with strong Chinese nationalism; particularly, after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mandarin was also regarded as a national language (Wang, 2014; Zhang & Jing, 2011). As language represents one's social identity (Thornborrow, 1999), Mandarin has been closely connected with Chinese national identity (Wang, 2014; Zhang & Jing, 2011); thus, one would think that the people of Hong Kong, many of whom are Chinese immigrants, or their children, would display some respect for Mandarin. However, on the surface, Hong Kong people's resistance to Mandarin seems to be in conflict with Joanna Thornborrow's (1999) theory of language representing identity.

Recent studies have noted the challenges of Mandarin speakers in Hong Kong and recommended policy revision to Hong Kong policymakers and education practitioners (e.g., Gu & Tong, 2012; Gu & Qu, 2015). However, beliefs about Mandarin among the local population cannot be easily improved by policy amendments or critiques due to its profound social and political origins (Bolton, 2011). Indeed, Bourdieu (2005) claimed that simply looking at what is happening, what people do or what people say is not enough to understand the complexity of human interactions. Rather, Bourdieu (2005) suggests we should analyse the field in which all the human interactions occur. Our study maps out the field of Mandarin use in Hong Kong from a socio-historical perspective; meanwhile, we will negotiate the discourse that results in the Hong Kong citizens' negative attitudes towards Mandarin.

Following another component of Bourdieu's theory, our study also deals with the habitus of four teachers as sojourn professionals from mainland China living in Hong Kong. The rationale for choosing these professionals is not only the fact that the previous studies have failed to examine this seemingly meritocratic social group whose members are well-educated. Most importantly, the study should also be carried out because these four teachers claim to be victims of injustice caused by their Mandarin mother tongue habitus. Bourdieu (1999, p. 629) pointed out that: "the most primitive expressions of moral sufferings… are produced by all the… muted violence of everyday life." However, people tend to use material poverty to gauge human suffering, which often distracts us from the violence produced by social mechanisms (Bourdieu, 1999). By exposing this muted violence and the mechanism that constructs it, we can at least let the sufferers feel exonerated and let them attribute their suffering to social reasons, and perhaps we can offer opportunities for social change (Bourdieu, 1999).

The theoretical framework: bourdieusian habitus, field and symbolic capital

Bourdieu (1986, p. 101) uses an equation, "[(Habitus)(Capital)]+Field=Practice," to explain that human practice is the result of the interaction(s) between habitus (people's dispositions), capital (resources granted to people), and the field (social stage). Habitus is a collection of a person's dispositions such as behaviour, perceptions, taste, and language (Bourdieu, 1994). Bourdieu (1994) believed the human body is a site incorporated with its unique history of class, origin, family upbringing and life experiences, leading people to have their respective habitus. In this vein, human behaviour is a reflection of their habitus, and people with similar backgrounds are likely to have a similar habitus. The field is the social stage on which people act and interact. However, the field is not static; it changes with history and knowledge formed in discourses (Thompson, 2008). The field is also a space of power, in which people with different habitus compete for domination and superiority of their dispositions

over others, e.g., speakers of official French are given more respect than those speaking a Parisian dialect, and the behaviour of a working class student becomes inconsistent in socialising with elite students (Thompson, 1991). Such a process produces a distinction between social classes, and the dominant class and has more power to decide knowledge in the field and to keep their capitals (Bourdieu, 1984). As in all competitions, both the dominant and the subjugated classes attempt to maintain or obtain supremacy. As Bourdieu (1998, pp. 40-41) claimed:

It (the field) contains people who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field … It is this power that defines their position in the field and as a result, their strategies.

The dominant class, thus, passes down symbols of their dispositions, such as certain ideologies, language, taste, or ways of doing things (Bourdieu, 2004). Because the field is built by the dominant class, these symbols are arbitrarily selected and automatically recognised as legitimate symbolic capital (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Schubert, 2008). Symbolic capital can be converted into cultural, economic, or capital of other kinds in the field to ensure the individual has enough resources to be successful and retain supremacy; however, those without the symbols are marginalised and suffer from symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Narrative inquiry

Narrative inquiry is used to demonstrate each of our research participants' habitus - particularly their mother tongue, and their experience of using Mandarin in Hong Kong in opposition to the field. Narrative inquiry is an experience-near methodology (Geertz, 2000), useful in exploring people's lives, particularly the little known lived experience related to sociocultural and political contexts (Squire, Davis, Esin, Andrews, Harrison, Hyden, & Hyden, 2014). These features of narrative inquiry are suitable in the current study for exploring power and oppression in the linguistic domain of teachers in postcolonial Hong Kong, as these issues are contextual and random in their everyday mundane lives (according to the teachers), which can only be felt and shared by themselves. As Katarzyna Gajek (2014, p. 14) commented on narrative inquiry: "We have no other possible means to describe the time we have lived apart from the narrative." Meanwhile, to understand these teachers' habitus as a part of Bourdieusian analysis, we have to demonstrate their life stories according to their linguistic and cultural backgrounds, and we believe the teachers themselves are the most suitable to narrate and theorise based on their own stories. As Janet Holland, Caroline Ramazanoglu, Sue Sharpe and Rachel Thomson, (1998, p. 3) pointed out: "through narratives, people tell others who they are… they are themselves and they try to act as though they are who they say they are."

Narrative inquiry requires the trust established between the researchers and the participants in order to guarantee confidentiality in their storytelling (Gajek, 2014). We purposively invited four teachers (pseudonym, i.e., Mei, Lan, Jv, and Zhu) based on our personal relationships. During our years of friendship with them, we not only gained mutual trust, but most importantly, we came to realise their difficulties in Hong Kong. Face-to-face unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews were used, along with WeChat, a social media apparatus, to follow up on our interviews. All the dialogues were in Mandarin, which were subsequently translated into English after transcription. From the interviews, we formulated life histories for each of the four teachers. We sent these stories back to them for correction and confirmation.

Hong Kong as the field

The Marginalisation of Mandarin in the Cold War

To better understand the background of the field, a brief historical snapshot can bring perspective. Bourdieu claimed that a particular language might succeed in becoming dominant over other marginalised languages in a colony (cited in Thompson, 1991). Gu and Qu (2015) found such a linguistic hierarchy in Hong Kong, where both English and Cantonese enjoy a higher status than Mandarin. The formation of such a hierarchy appears inseparable from history and politics. English became Hong Kong's official language as part of its British colonisation in 1842 with the defeat of China in the 1st Sino-Britain Opium War followed by the signing of Nanking Treaty. English was used in government documents, as well as in matters of law, commerce, and the medium of instruction in higher education (Pierson, 1992). Generally speaking, English enjoyed important linguistic capital for elite Hong Kong people to compete in the field. Although Cantonese was used as the vernacular among most Hong Kong Chinese, the colonial government tended not to integrate with the local Chinese (Tsai, 1994). So Cantonese did not attain a legitimate status until 1974 (Bolton, 2011), and the establishment of the position of Cantonese was catalysed after the outbreak of the decolonisation movements such as the 1967 strike, upon which the government felt obliged to "close the gap" with Hong Kong Chinese to sustain the colonial governance (Young, 1994). However, it was the communists from China who planned the 1967 strike (Young, 1994). Meanwhile, due to Britain's allegiance with the US, Hong Kong became the "Berlin Wall in the East", a vital front line in Asia against Soviet and Chinese Communism (Tang, 1994).

Therefore, in order to avoid a recurrence of the 1967 strike and other interventions by communist China, the colonial government in Hong Kong was determined to depoliticise the local Chinese and distance them from the mainland (Young, 1994) following what Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1990) named cultural arbitraries, excluding the mainland Chinese culture and Mandarin out of Hong Kong's education as commented by Ting Hong Wong

(2017). The colonial government clamped down on the schools that were friendly to the mainland communists (Lau, 2018), e.g., the closing of Ta Teh Institute (Xiaosi, 2015), and the closing of left-wing newspaper publishers (Young, 1994). Degrees conferred by Chinese universities were not recognised by the colonial government (Wong, 2005). Restricting the learning and use of Mandarin became another measure of depoliticisation (Wong, 2017): Mandarin as a public examination subject was also eliminated (Pierson, 1992).

As a result, Mandarin in Hong Kong became very restricted until the eve of the handover of sovereignty to China in 1997 (Adamson & Lai, 1997). Against such political background, Mandarin-speaking immigrants were assimilated into the language of the Cantonese majority in Hong Kong (Pierson, 1992). The assimilation of Mandarin speakers to Cantonese can be explained by the theory of Janet Holmes (2008, p. 57), who claimed:

Where one group arrogates political power and imposes its language along with its institutions - government administration, law courts, education, religion - it is likely that minority groups will find themselves under increasing pressure to adopt the language of the dominant group.

Generally speaking, politics and the cultural exclusion discourse against communist China made by the colonial government contributed to Hong Kong people's alienation and prejudice towards Mandarin, as it could be symbolically connected to communism. Although the Cold War has passed and Britain has returned Hong Kong's sovereignty to China, negative perceptions towards Mandarin remain close to the surface in Hong Kong. Wong (2016, p. 200) claims it is due to Hong Kong people's fear of their future generations being "manipulated" by the Communist China government, and thus "language has become for them an important front in the struggle for control over the destiny of Hong Kong".

From a postcolonial perspective, it appears that Hong Kong people seem to not totally have been absolved of the influence of the colonial discourse. What should not be overlooked is that colonialism does not die with the return of political sovereignty (Dei, 2006). As Molefi Kete Asante (2006, p. ix) claimed: "The coloniser did not only seize land, but also minds." Colonialism manipulates the structure and the knowledge that safeguard the rulings of the colonisers, and concurrently subjugates the colonised people to go along with the colonial discourse without criticality (Sylvester, 2017).

The Rise of Local Hong Kong Identity That Preferred Cantonese

People describe themselves and others by using the label of the group they belong to, which is referred to as one's social identity (Myers & Spencer, 2005). People obtain self-awareness from the ingroup's social identity, and they are inclined to positively describe their groups in order to view themselves in a positive light (Turner, 1984). On the other side of the coin, people often compare their ingroup with outgroups to favour and prioritise their own, which is called ingroup bias (Turner, 1984). These terms appear to apply well to the present study. Ying-yi Hong, Jill Coleman, Gloria Chan, Rosanna Wong, Chi-yue

Chiu, Ian G Hansen, Sau-lai Lee, Yuk-yue Tong, and Ho-ying Fu (2004) found Hong Kong people have strong ingroup bias against the Chinese mainlanders. Below, we analyse how a Hong Kong identity emerges and is differentiated from the identity of the mainlanders in terms of ingroup biases.

A comparison between now and the past

Ethnically and ancestrally, Hong Kong people are Chinese. Historically, Hong Kong people experienced strong Chinese nationalism, because when the colony was built, the colonial government had no interest in changing the local Chinese's nationality or emotional affiliations: the colonizer was eager to nurture Chinese middlemen who could use both English and Chinese to assist in trading with China (Luk, 1991). At the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, Hong Kong had been the education incubator for many patriotic revolutionary leaders leading China's major events of modernization, and one such leader was the University of Hong Kong (HKU) graduate, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of The Republic of China, who overthrew the last feudalist emperor of the Qing kingdom in the Revolution of 1911 (Luk, 1991). The 1911 Revolution also greatly encouraged Hong Kong people's determination to fight colonialism (Tsai, 1994). Many famous anti-colonial activities in Hong Kong were the results of cooperation with the mainlanders, for example, the Canton-Hong Kong Strike in 1925 and the 1967 Strike (Chan, 1994). Even when China was embargoed by the US, Japan or/and many European countries in the Anti-Japanese War and the Korea War, Hong Kong people smuggled out necessary weapons and medicine in support of their mainland counterparts (Carroll, 2007; Chan, 1994).

However, in a 2018 Public Opinion Program survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong on Hong Kong people's recognition of ethnic identity, Hong Kong people have the strongest recognition of themselves as Hong Kongnese, while their weakest recognition of themselves was as citizens of the People's Republic of China (HKU POP, 2018). One widely reported incident appears to underscore this sentiment among some of the population. In 2017, two newly elected Hong Kong Legislative Council members, publicly claimed Hong Kong was not a part of China and while using the term "Shina," a derogatory term meaning "China," when giving their oath of office (Hai, 2016, Oct, 20th). Further, Hong Kong football fans regularly boo when the Chinese National Anthem is played at football matches despite receiving warnings from the International Football Association (Feng, 2018, Oct, 12th). After observing that Hong Kong people seldom identify themselves as Chinese when travelling abroad, John Lowe and Yuk-ha Tsang (2017, p. 138) commented: "[As] descendants of Han Chinese, Hong Kongers continue to identify themselves in opposition to Mainlanders and remain unapologetic in their exclusionary attitude."

De-nationalisation of Chinese identity through education

Nowadays, Hong Kong people seem to have incurred a huge loss in their self-recognition as Chinese nationals. Regarding phenomena like this, Homi

Bhabha (1994) claimed that the colonisers establish a hybrid identity among their colonised people, making them admire European values while distaining their indigenous origins. Indeed, the Hong Kong identity is a recent product of the British colonial government (Ho, 2009).

As a strategy during the Cold War, in order to further depoliticise and distance Hong Kong people from communist China, the colonial government retained only those school subjects that were connected to traditional Chinese literature, literacy, and history in the curriculum, while eliminating any subjects related to the situation of modern and contemporary China (Wong, 2012). In those curricula, the colonisers beautified the British invasion of China, stressed the pragmatic use of Chinese language as a politics-free tool in Hong Kong, and emphasized the learning of traditional Chinese culture only for Hong Kong people's appreciation of arts and their comparative understanding of the Western culture (Wong, 2012). Simultaneously, the education department attempted to build up Hong Kong people's intimacy with English and Western- centred culture. In the 1970s, Hong Kong school textbooks were almost all written in English (Yip, 2013, April, 19th); history lessons used White European Centric angles to situate other races as barbarians, and school subjects such as art, geography, and medicine all focused on Western knowledge (Yip, 2013, April, 19th). Since the late 1970s, the colonial government sponsored secondary schools that used English as a medium of instruction and some famous schools replaced Chinese literacy with English or French (Yip, 2013, April, 19th). As a result, the education system acted to instil a de-nationalised feeling or political indifference towards the mainland among younger Hong Kong people (Lowe & Tsang, 2017; Wong, 2012; Young, 1994).

Forging Hong Kong identity through public entertainment

As part of the strategy to develop a singular Hong Kong identity, cultural issues were also addressed. Using a "close-gap" strategy with people of Hong Kong after the 1967 strike, the colonial government encouraged the development of the local culture, which helped propagate a distinctive local identity (Ho, 2009). Before this time, during the hundred years of colonial governance, culture and art appreciation were confined only to Hong Kong's elite minority, while the emergence of the local identity was suppressed (Ho, 2009). With the blooming of Hong Kong local culture, the television, film and music industries flourished, while promoting a modern Hong Kong lifestyle (Yu & Kwan, 2017). However, concurrently, the mainland was portrayed as a "chaotic, poor, and backward" place (Ho, 2009, p. 81), though mainland China was indeed involved in the Cultural Revolution and poverty. Underneath the cover of the increasing concern of Hong Kong people's well-being, the colonial government was actually preventing people's participation in anti-colonial social activities, such as the 1967 strike. According to Herbert Marcuse (1991), public entertainment can be considered a new technology of ruling people because it eradicates people's sense of class differences by encouraging them to use the same products and to enjoy the same shows. Moreover, the support of a

local identity actually acted as a soft political precaution against the possible intervention of the mainland's communist ideology (Ho, 2009). The underlying purposes of the colonial government, however, were undetected by most Hong Kong people. At least on the surface, local Hong Kong people began to regard themselves as living in a modernised, international city that was much different from the chaotic backwater, or "other" China (Chan, 2014).

Hong Kong people's neoliberal identity under the Laissez-Faire policy

Scholars, such as Fu-Lai Yu and Diana Kwan (2017) have stressed that Hong Kong's economic take-off and the "Lion Rock Spirit" (symbolising the diligence of Hong Kong people), foregrounded by the colonial government's postwar Laissez-Faire policy, has contributed to Hong Kong people's sense of identity. This has only sharpened the perceived differences with mainland China. Yu and Kwan (2017) appear to be correct to some extent, but their explanation does not provide a complete picture. The Laissez-Faire policy in nature is related to neoliberalism, which requires the government to reduce its control over the market and to embrace market meritocracy. Under such a policy, Hong Kong has indeed progressed economically (Mizuoka, 2014). However, under neoliberal policies, the government has dodged its responsibility in providing for its citizens' well--being; and instead, citizens are blamed for their own incapability in maintaining jobs, health, or even education (Giroux, 2002). Therefore, the Laissez-Faire policy forced Hong Kong people to compete with each other for better living and resources, which diverted their attention away from confrontations with the coloniser and helped to mask the economic inequality, which was fundamentally caused by the colonial structure (Mizuoka, 2014).

Most importantly, neoliberal policy spreads consumerist and individualistic values, which can alienate people from the influence of a national identity (Green, 2006) like Hong Kong people's alienation to the national identity of Chinese. However, what should not be forgotten is that the prosperity of Hong Kong after WWII is inseparable from the influx of immigrants from mainland China, who became pillars of human capital; the wealth transferred by companies from Shanghai that enriched Hong Kong's manufacturing industry should also be considered (Tang, 1994). Nevertheless, Hong Kong's flourishing as one of the "Four Asian Tigers" made local people economically better-off than their counterparts in the mainland. In sum, a multiplicity of factors, many of which stemmed from Hong Kong's relationship with the mainland, contributed to Hong Kong people's somewhat ironic, negative attitude towards mainland China (Gordon, Ma, Lui, 2008).

Mainland China - Hong Kong Group Conflicts

The colonial government's intentional forging of the Hong Kong identity has laid the foundation of an ingroup bias that serves to further distance Hong Kong's population from that of the mainland. This separation has been further exacerbated since the sovereignty handover, under which the mainland leadership makes the constitutional level decisions in Hong Kong creating a

feeling of inferiority among the local population. The increasing number of mainlanders visiting and being allowed to settle down in Hong Kong has only intensified the feeling of otherness towards mainlanders. As David Myers and Steven Spencer (2005. p. 352) explain: "We also are more prone to ingroup bias when our group is small and lower in status relative to the out-group." Therefore, Hong Kong people are more aware of their identity, as Hong Kongnese, which, to them, has become a bulwark against China's "mainlandisation" (Lowe & Tsang, 2017). In recent years, as mainland China-Hong Kong conflicts have gone viral, some local media's and censored textbooks' negative labelling of mainlanders have enhanced the ingroup bias. In the meantime, because people tend to associate the languages they speak with a particular sociocultural identity (Thomas, 1999) Mandarin, as the official language of the mainland, is perceived as the symbol of mainland Chinese identity, and promoting Mandarin in Hong Kong is suspected in building an identity politically related to the mainland regime (Lai & Byram, 2006); therefore, Cantonese has become an even stronger symbol of maintaining the Hong Kong identity.

Mainland China becoming the scapegoat of Hong Kong' manufacturing industry transfer

The differentiation between the Hong Kong and Chinese identities has recently become more radical because of a series of anti-mainland China or anti-mainlander activities. One example of this hostility by extremist parties occurred in 2012 when Apple Daily, a local broadsheet, published a full-page colour advertisement showing a gigantic locust perched on Lion Rock. This image was meant to symbolise mainlanders as resource scavengers invading Hong Kong (Lowe & Tsang, 2017). Another example occurred in 2015 when Hong Kong activists besieged and verbally abused mainland tourists in the name of anti-cross-border smugglers (Li, 2016). These examples are just two of many anti-mainland activities that have occurred and continue to occur on a frequent basis; they represent the Hong Kong-mainland China conflicts accumulated over time.

Myers & Spencer (2005, p.350) use "realistic group conflict theory" to describe an ethnic community's irrational redirection of hostility to another when experiencing frustration, such as in an economic downturn: "When two groups compete for jobs, housing, or social prestige, one group's goal fulfilment can become the other group's frustration." Myers and Spencer (2005) use the example of the Jews during post-WWI who became the scapegoats of Germany's economic decline after the country's defeat. However, when the economy is booming and living standards are comfortable, society turns to be more inclusive and relationships among ethnic groups are calm (Myers & Spencer, 2005).

Realistic group conflict theory could also be used to interpret the root cause of the recent anti-mainlander activities in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has enjoyed the trappings of a developed economy since its taking off in 1970s after the implementation of the Laissez-Faire policy, and it is ranked by the United Nations Development Program as the 13th "Very High human development" region

globally (UNDP, 2011). However, Hong Kong was also shortlisted as one of the most unequal cities in Asia in 2008 by the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (2008). The rich-poor disparity indicator, the Gini coefficient, of Hong Kong climbed from 0.451 in 1981 to 0.525 in 2001, and to 0.533 in 2006 (Cheng, 2014; Chan, Cheung & Lai, 2014). Though it dropped to 0.473 in 2016, yet it is still higher than other developed countries/regions (Oxfam, 2018). The World Bank (2012) reported that for the 10 years (from 1998 to 2008), Hong Kong household income remained stagnant at $18000, and until 2016 the household income of the top 10% rich family is 44 times more than those in the lowest decile (Oxfam, 2018). With the Neoliberal reform in mainland China in the late 1970s, the Pearl River Delta with its cheap labour force attracted labour-intensive manufacturing industries from Hong Kong (Cheng, 2014). Enjoying the profits brought by the cheap manual labour in mainland China, the manufacturing sectors in Hong Kong failed to develop core technologies (Cheng, 2014), which, in the theory of knowledge economy is a key measure for improving human capital and sustaining region's advantages in globalisation (Becker, 2006). Therefore, as claimed by Cheng Yu-shek (2014), Hong Kong industry was weakened and it seriously damaged the employment opportunities and upward social mobility of the local populace. In the minds of the Hong Kong public at large, the after effect of this industrial shift, wage stagnation and falling living standard since the 1997 handover (Cheng, 2014) was caused by the mainland China.

Mass media and textbooks exaggerating some mainland tourists' uncivilised behaviours

Meanwhile, annually, more than 40 million mainland tourists have visited Hong Kong since the launch of the Individual Visit Scheme - the Chinese government's decision to support Hong Kong's sales and tourism industry in the aftermath of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (Cheng, 2014). However, several incidents regarding the behaviour of mainland visitors have led to a decline in their image in the eyes of locals. These include: uncivilised public behaviour by a very small minority; the smuggling of infant milk powder from Hong Kong, which drove up the local price; and mainland tourists giving birth to children in Hong Kong to obtain citizenships (Wong, 2016; Ye, Qiu, & Yuen, 2011; Zhang, Wong, & Lai, 2018). Naturally, what the media reports does not represent the vast majority of mainlanders in Hong Kong. According to John Flowerdew, David Li, and Sarah Tran (2002), the Hong Kong media have created a discriminatory discourse against mainlanders. Other researchers (e.g., Kung, 2013; Wang, 2006) have reached similar conclusions. The media is a principal means for people to obtain information and understand the world around them; media formulates the dominant discourse in a society, and how an issue is linguistically represented in the media is difficult to change (Thornborrow, 1999).

More recently, some major media such as People's Daily of China (13th, Sep, 2019) reported the prejudiced portraits of mainlanders in some Hong Kong textbooks of liberal education. Set up in 2007, the liberal education is a com-

pulsory course for public secondary school students in Hong Kong, and students have to sit exams in liberal education in order to graduate. However, as the education bureau did not stipulate any textbooks, commercial publishers produced almost all the liberal education textbooks with no governmental censorship. Some of the textbooks include discriminatory portraits of mainlanders, for instance in the Mui Tak Hui-Dai (2015, p.188), a liberal education textbook published by Hong Kong Educational Publishing company. The following excerpts from the textbook are intended to have students to reflect on the group conflicts of mainland China and Hong Kong and its influence on Hong Kong people's recognition of Chinese identity, but the texts keep inculcating the students' some nonnegotiable statements that mainland China is changing Hong Kong's culture, and Chinese mainlanders are grabbing resources of Hong Kong from different aspects and it annoys Hong Kong people. Thus, Hong Kong people do not want to be recognised as Chinese in future:

There are cultural differences between mainland China and Hong Kong, among which some cause conflicts. When some mainlanders arrived at Hong Kong, they paid little attention to the rituals and norms, which cause Hong Kong people anger. Meanwhile, Hong Kong has returned to China for many years, some culture from the mainland spread to Hong Kong, which changed the local society (our translation) (Hui-Dai, 2015, p.188).

Some Hong Kong people think the mainlanders snatch Hong Kong's resources; the mainlanders think Hong Kong is open for everyone to visit, and to consume in Hong Kong is helping Hong Kong's economic development … More and more mainlanders study in Hong Kong universities and stay for jobs, becoming Hong Kong drifters. Some Hong Kong people blame the mainlanders occupying university resources, those working in Hong Kong are snatching "rice bowls" off the locals, which causes Hong Kong people's negative recognition of Chinese identity … The panic mainlanders purchasing milk power/medicine (in Hong Kong): mainlanders are more confident of the milk powder and medicine sold in Hong Kong, so many profiteers appear in Sheung Shui and Fanling (two bordering districts of Hong Kong), who deliver and sell goods in the mainland from Hong Kong…causing Hong Kong people's negative recognition as Chinese (our translation) (Hui-Dai, 2015, p.188).

However, as mentioned, Chinese mainlanders are very numerous and heterogeneous. The books use just a few negative examples to over-generalise a whole mainlander community. Taking some Chinese mainlanders' unethical behaviour as the full reason for why Hong Kong people resisting Chinese identity is also not holistic. Most importantly the textbook does not give students any critical guidance on the opinions, not even on the humiliating label of Chinese mainlanders: 'locusts', whereas the textbook attempts to enhance such misrecognition of the mainlanders by asking the students to think for themselves and "add other recent relevant incidents into the table" (our translation) (Hui-Dai, 2015, p. 188). Examples of misrepresenting Chinese mainlanders are many in the Hong Kong liberal education textbooks, as reported by People's Daily of China (13th, Sep, 2019). What is noteworthy is that the textbooks

are often regarded as authoritarian materials (Gulliver, 2010), and students may regard these portraits of Chinese mainlanders as neutral information or "truth," but Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) pointed out that textbooks are the result of mediation of politics, economy, culture, and conflicts, and textbook makers can create textbooks based on their interests and prejudice.

Thus, the negative reporting of the mainlanders, particularly those labelling the mainlanders as locusts, can perpetuate ethnic stereotypes as illustrated by Ishtla Singh (1999). According to the realistic group conflict theory, when a given population's living standard deteriorates, and an outside group enters to "scavenge resources," the frictions between the two social groups increase, which culminates in hostility towards the outsiders. In the case of Hong Kong after the handover, it has been the speakers of Mandarin, the outside group, who have been vilified.

The four teachers' habitus

The intricate field of identity and group formation of Hong Kong people described above contains the individuals who arrived in Hong Kong from the mainland and who had little awareness of the multifaceted complexity of the field. Thus, this section attempts to provide a brief snapshot by relating a few critical episodes experienced by four mainland teachers which appear to be reflective of the challenges of a somewhat targeted outgroup.

Mei's Story

Mei is a lecturer in a university in Hong Kong. Born in a small town in Northwestern China, Mei's parents are civil servants. The family communicates in Mandarin Chinese. Mei developed a hobby in reciting poetry, which motivated her to pursue her undergraduate degree in Chinese literature. After graduating, she worked as a volunteer in a Confucius college in the US, and then she completed her doctorate in Hong Kong where the working language in her university was English. Although she has lived in Hong Kong for five years, she does not speak Cantonese very well. After graduation she was recruited as a lecturer by another Hong Kong university to teach Chinese. Mei and her Hong Kong colleagues get on well, and in Mei's spare time she watches Hong Kong TV programs to learn Cantonese.

Mei shared two incidents, one in which she and her husband were physically and verbally assaulted by a Hong Kong man in a hospital, and the other in which her next door neighbour made offensive noises and intentionally locked her door whenever Mei and her husband left home. Mei believes that both cases happened because the people heard Mei and her husband speaking in Mandarin. Regarding the incident in the hospital, Mei felt she and his husband were completely without blame. One night after work, Mei suddenly had an allergic reaction so she and her husband rushed to the hospital, but there was a long wait of almost eight hours before she received treatment. During

the wait, all the patients were tired, with some so fatigued that they lay on the bench in the emergency area and took a nap. Mei also slept on a chair, with her feet against the bench legs in front of her. A man waiting nearby, annoyed by her behaviour, stood up without saying a word and sat behind Mei and her husband. When Mei woke up, she murmured a few words to her husband in Mandarin, but upon doing so, the man fiercely kicked Mei's chair, and began loudly scolding Mei for her unhygienic and uncivilised behaviour for putting her feet behind another's chair. Mei's husband then began scuffling with the man, which resulted in a police intervention. Mei felt it unnecessary for the man to overreact in such a way, and was convinced that it was her use of Mandarin that triggered his violent behaviour.

In the other incident with her neighbour, Mei also felt that the discrimination against Mandarin was a factor. After graduation, she and her husband moved into a flat. Soon after moving in, Mei noticed that every time she opened her flat door, she heard the next door neighbour lock their door at home, or make offensive noises. At the beginning, Mei thought it was just coincidence, as both families seldom met each other and Mei assumed she never offended them; but the same situation continued for almost half a year, until one day Mei's mother visited her. When they opened the door in the corridor while chatting, the neighbour made offensive noises again. When they tried to confront the neighbours, they refused to open their door. Since this episode, the offensive noises had stopped; however, Mei was convinced that the reason for the neighbour's hostility was prejudice against mainlanders because they heard Mei speaking in Mandarin. Nevertheless, Mei is an optimistic person, who believes most Hong Kong people are gentle and caring, and she has some Hong Kong friends. Mei wants to continue to live and work in Hong Kong.

Lan's Story

Lan is the principal of an international school in Fujian Province of mainland China who will soon become a research fellow in a Hong Kong university. As her continuing professional development training, she attended a master-level course in Hong Kong University to extend her expertise in education. Before she came to Hong Kong, she completed her first degree in the UK and a master degree in business in Australia. Having grown up in Fujian, Mandarin and Min Nan dialect are her mother tongues. She does not quite understand Cantonese nor is she able to speak it. Lan shared some of her experiences of everyday life in Hong Kong. She noted that taxi drivers greet her very impatiently when hearing Lan and her friends using Mandarin. She claimed that some shop assistants would not serve Mandarin speakers and steer her to assistants who can speak some Mandarin. Upon realising she is a mainlander, they tend to take on an air of superiority, while belittling mainland products. Despite her unhappy experiences, Lan said she can feel the increasing tolerance of Mandarin in Hong Kong, and believes that Hong Kong people are so pragmatic that they will know the unstoppable rise of China and the importance of Mandarin.

Jv's Story

Jv is a Mandarin head teacher in a kindergarten in Hong Kong. She teaches K-3 Hong Kong children, whose mother tongue is Cantonese; she also teaches Chinese literacy, music, and art in Mandarin, which she feels is particularly challenging because the children had never learnt Mandarin before K-3 and their parents only spoke with them in Cantonese at home. After graduating with a master degree in Hong Kong, she took up this position. Having grown up near the Yangtze River Delta, Jv's mother tongue is Mandarin plus her local dialect, so she does not understand Cantonese. However, in the kindergarten, no other colleagues, including the principal, are able to speak Mandarin well. Jv and her colleagues can communicate in English sometimes, but they tend to use Cantonese when talking to Jv, and even though Mandarin has now become an important subject in the school, her colleagues sometimes make fun of Mandarin when they are talking to Jv. This makes Jv feel both confused and disrespected. In her daily life, Jv admitted that she is able to use Mandarin outside the school to conduct her daily affairs; however, she senses that sometimes Hong Kong merchants are not so welcoming when she speaks Mandarin.

Zhu's Story

Zhu is a Professor at a Hong Kong university. She was born in North China and finished her primary and secondary education there. As a Republic of Ireland permanent citizen, she finished her Master's and then her PhD in Ireland during her earlier life and settled down there. Her entire family moved to Hong Kong five years ago when she was offered a position at the university. Mandarin and English are the languages she uses to communicate with her family and colleagues. Though Zhu does not speak Cantonese, her working relationship with colleagues in her Hong Kong university have proceeded smoothly due to her fluent English, although sometimes some Hong Kong students, whose English and Mandarin are a little weak, cannot fully communicate with her. However, in daily life, outside of her workplace, Zhu has felt offended many times when she speaks Mandarin or when she is identified as a mainlander.

Zhu told us that when she first came to Hong Kong, visiting a supermarket, she used Mandarin to beckon a worker more than twice, but the attendant looked at Zhu and insisted on not giving her any service; however, later when she used English to complain to the manager, everyone including the indifferent attendant started to show great respect. Another episode made Zhu and her family especially disappointed with Hong Kong people. When Zhu's husband, Nick, was seriously ill and hospitalised, a patient in the next bed, a Hong Kong man in his 60s, assaulted and verbally abused him by calling him a "locust" and "resource scavenger," after realising Zhu and Nick were Chinese mainlanders when they spoke in Mandarin. It appeared that the man was annoyed that a mainlander was using Hong Kong's medical resources. Zhu, who was not present at the time of the abuse, was told of the incident when she returned from work, however, she was shocked that the hospital let the abuse happen.

Discussion and conclusion

Although each of these individual episodes could be termed anecdotes of over-sensitivity on the part of the mainlanders involved, collectively, they begin to reveal a pattern of soft violence towards Mandarin speakers in Hong Kong. These teachers' narratives provide a flavour for the types of reactions mainlanders sometimes experience when encountering Hong Kong locals, and reveal that even those whose backgrounds have provided them the social capital to secure relatively good career prospects in Hong Kong sometimes experience discrimination. Even though they could not speak Cantonese well, English and sometimes Mandarin in the working space provided them with the linguistic capital to interact with their colleagues and students on an equal footing, despite some occasional challenges when the students' English or Mandarin was not strong enough to communicate.

The discrimination the teachers experienced when using Mandarin in their everyday lives echoes what Kim-ming Lee and Kam Yee Law (2014) claim is a pervasive neocolonial racism in Hong Kong, and white primacy is pursued at the expense of other ethnic groups who are negatively stereotyped due to the colonial legacy and the influence of Western-oriented neoliberal globalisation. The scar of colonialism may be difficult to erase even after the decolonisation movement, as "no branch of learning was left untouched by the colonial experience" (Loomba, 1998, p.53) and every means of consumption practice (Lee & Law, 2014) served to reshape knowledge and the identity of the colonised people (Loomba, 1998). As discussed above, the British coloniser used a plethora of arbitrary cultural technologies to distance Hong Kong people from mainland China, and to change Hong Kong people's knowledge of Mandarin and themselves.

Thus, when the four teachers speak Mandarin, the people around them automatically associate them with symbols of the mainland China and undervalue them. Using Mandarin, thus, has made the teachers instantly lose symbolic capital in front of their dominant Cantonese speaking counterparts, unless the teachers demonstrate their meritocratic social capital recognised in the field - speaking fluent English. Nevertheless, there is nothing wrong with the teachers using Mandarin in the field, and they should be respected when they speak their mother tongue to their family, not only because Mandarin is an official language in Hong Kong recognised by law, but also because Mandarin represents and sustains the teachers' ethnic heritage. What should be noted is that as an anti-colonialism technology, language (in this case Mandarin), holds an important role in emancipating the minds of the colonised people (Dei, 2006). The role of Mandarin herein is not only useful in rebuilding a national identity, but also for breaking free from the social exclusion forged around the colonial hegemony, which has been used to silence some voices, to eradicate certain identities, and to mask some history (Dei, 2006)

When Zhu's husband, Nick, was lying on the hospital bed, being called a "locust", he was automatically viewed as a negative symbol of the Hong Kong

resource scavenger, due to his Mandarin heritage. The locust is a symbol of mainlanders fabricated by extremists, but the information has been delivered by the mass media to the general public. Bourdieu's colleague, Patrick Champagne (1999) pointed out that all the social malaises are fabricated by journalists, and the reality may not be all the media represents because journalists produce any piece of news for the interests of themselves and their industry. The media's report may consciously or subconsciously stigmatise and portray some community negatively, and thus reinforce the conflicts between communities (Champagne, 1999). Indeed, Thornborrow (1999) claimed once a representation is formulated in the media, it is difficult to formulate an alternative because media is an important technology, a hegemony that produces its own common sense. Although scholars like Flowerdew, Li, and Tran (2002) have reminded people of the potential bias the Hong Kong media carries onto the Chinese mainlanders, the public are buried in a habitual and uncritical quotidian life (Lowe & Tsang, 2017). Such loss of criticality is also what the coloniser has trained the subalterns to be; to stifle the subalterns' creativity and criticality is to suppress people's potential resistance in order to legitimise the colonial rule (Asante, 2006). Comparing the mainlanders to locusts has been inculcated to the Hong Kong students through the textbooks without any criticality, which, in Bourdieu and Passeron's (1990) sense, can reflect that Hong Kong's liberal education for the public schools is still imposing cultural arbitraries to the students and is, therefore, symbolically violent in nature.

Generally speaking, the four sojourn teachers, to various extents, are the victims of symbolic violence when they speak Mandarin. The source of such violence is the abuse of power of the enforcers who sustain the dominant positions in the field, whose discourse is formulated by the colonial government to downgrade mainland China. However, the HKSAR government should also be partially responsible for this problem, because they have ignored and denied the seriousness of racial discrimination in Hong Kong (Lee & Law, 2014). Out of the pressure from some NGOs like UN Human Rights Committee, the Hong Kong Racial Discrimination Ordinance (HKRDO) was enacted in 2009; however, the HKRDO has excluded mainland Chinese new immigrants from being an ethnic minority in Hong Kong; therefore, this law offers no protection to mainlanders (Lee & Law, 2014). Perhaps, to the policymakers in the SAR government, ethnically, Hong Kong people and the mainlanders are both Chinese; however, intentionally neglecting the division between Hong Kong people and mainlanders is against the postcolonial reality. With this study, we hope to bring some reflections to the policymakers.

Acknowledgement

This study is sponsored by Macau Foundation (Funding NO. MF1933). The authors would like to express thanks to the Editor-in-Chief Professor Aleksander Kobylarek, the Editor Ms Martyna Madej, and the reviewers for the valuable

suggestions. The authors would also like to say thanks to Dr Paul Stapleton from the Education University of Hong Kong for his careful proofreading and advice.

References

[1] Adamson, B. & Lai. W.A. (1997). Language and the curriculum in Hong Kong: dilemmas of triglossia. In M. Bray & W.O. Lee (Eds.), *Education and political transition: implications of Hong Kong's change of sovereignty* (pp. 87–100). Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong.
[2] Asante, M.K. (2006). Foreword. In G.J.S.Dei & A. Kempf (Eds.), *Anti-Colonialism and Education* (pp. ix-x). Rotterdam, Holland: Sense Publisher.
[3] Bacon-Shone, J. & Bolton, K. (1998). Charting Multilingualism: Language Censuses and Language Surveys in Hong Kong. In M.C. Pennington (Ed.). *Language in Hong Kong at Century's End* (pp. 43-90). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[4] Becker, G.S. (2006). The Age of Human Capital. In H. Lauder, P. Brown, J.-A. Dillabough, & A.H. Halsey (Eds.), *Education, Globalization & Social Change* (pp.292-94). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
[5] Bolton, K. (2011). Language Policy and Planning in Hong Kong: Colonial and post-colonial perspectives. *Applied Linguistics Review*, 2, 51-74.
[6] Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction*. Cambridge: Polity.
[7] Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods. In R. Collins, J. Curran, N. Gambam, & P. Scannell (Eds.), Media, *Culture and Society*. London: SAGE.
[8] Bourdieu, P. (1994). *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity.
[9] Bourdieu, P. (1998). *On Television and Journalism*. London: Pluto.
[10] Bourdieu, P. (1999). Postscript. In P. Bourdieu, A. Accardo, G. Balazs, S. Beaud, F. Bonvin, E. Bourdieu, P. Bourgois, S. Broccolichi, P. Champagne, R. Christin, J.-P. Faguer, S. Garcia, R. Lenoir, F. CEuvrard, M. Pialoux, L. Pinto, D. Podalydes, A. Sayad, C. Soulie & L.J.D. Wacquant (Eds.). *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (pp. 627-629). California: Stanford University Press.
[11] Bourdieu, P. (2004). *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Cambridge: Polity.
[12] Bourdieu, P. (2005). *The Social Structures of the Economy*. Cambridge: Polity.
[13] Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.C. (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture*. London: SAGE Publications.
[14] Bhabha, H.K. (1994). Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition. In P. Williams & L. Chrisman (Eds), *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory*, (pp. 112–123). New York: Columbia University Press.
[15] Carroll, J. M. (2007). *A Concise History of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[16] Chan, C.K. (2014). China as "Other": Resistance to and ambivalence toward national identity in Hong Kong. *China perspectives, Special Issue*, 25-34.
[17] Chan, A. C. M., Cheung, S.Y. L. & Lai, T.C.K. (2014). Widening of a Poverty Gap: A Condition of Governance Crisis in Hong Kong. *Advances in Applied Sociology, 4*, 69-84.
[18] Chan Lau, K.-c. (1994). Hong Kong in Sino-British Diplomacy, 1926-1945. In M.K. Chan (Ed.), *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain*, 1842-1992, (pp. 71-89). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[19] Champagne, P. (1999). The View from the Media. In P. Bourdieu, A. Accardo, G. Balazs, S. Beaud, F. Bonvin, E. Bourdieu, P. Bourgois, S. Broccolichi, P. Champagne, R. Christin, J.-P. Faguer, S. Garcia, R. Lenoir, F. CEuvrard, M. Pialoux, L. Pinto, D. Podalydes, A. Sayad, C. Soulie & L.J.D. Wacquant (Eds.). *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (pp. 46-59). California: Stanford University Press.
[20] Cheng, J.Y.-s.(2014). The Emergence of Radical Politics in Hong Kong: Causes and Impact. *The China Review, 14*(1), 199-232.
[21] [21] Dei, G.J.S. (2006). Introduction: Mapping the Terrain - Towards a New Politics of Resistance. In G.J.S. Dei & A.Kempf (Eds.), *Anti-Colonialism and Education* (pp.25-42). Rotterdam: Sense Publisher.

[22] Feng, H.L. (2018, Oct, 12th). Gangdui youyisai zaiyou qiumi xuguoge shimin:guogefa lifa keburonghuan, [There are again football fans booed at the national anthems in the friendly match. Citizens: The National Anthem Law is inevitable]. *Da Gong Bao*. Retrieved from: http://www.takungpao.com/news/232109/2018/1012/188123.html.
[23] Flowerdew, J., Li, D. C., & Tran, S. (2002). Discriminatory news discourse: some Hong Kong data. *Discourse & Society, 13*(3), 319-345.
[24] Gajek, K. (2014). Auto/narrative as a means of structur- ing human experience. In M. Kafar & M. Modrzejewska-Swigulska (Eds.), *Autobiography- biography-narration research practice for biographi- cal perspectives* (pp. 11–32). Krakow, Poland: Jagiellonian University Press.
[25] Geertz, C. (2000). *Local knowledge: Further essays in interpretive anthropology*. New York: Basic Books.
[26] Giroux, H. (2002). Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The university as a democratic public sphere. *Harvard educational review, 72*(4), 425-464.
[27] Gordon, M., MA, E. K.-W., & Lui, T.-L. (2008). *Hong Kong, China: Learning to belong to a nation*. London: Routledge.
[28] Green, A. (2006). Education, Globalization, and the Nation State. In H. Lauder, P. Brown, J-A. Dillabough. & A.H. Halsey (Eds.) *Education, Globalization & Social Change* (pp.192-197). Oxford, UK: The Oxford University Press.
[29] Gu, M. & Tong, H. K. (2012). Space, scale and languages: Identity construction of cross--boundary students in a multilingual university in Hong Kong. *Language and Education, 26*(6), 501-515.
[30] Gu, M. & Qu, X.D. (2015). Ideological disqualification in language use: being newcomers in primary education. *Research Papers in Education, 30*(4), 506-522.
[31] Gulliver, T. (2010). Immigrant success stories in ESL textbooks. *TESOL Quarterly*, *44*(4), 725-745.
[32] Hai, S.W. (2016, Oct, 20th). Gangdu Yiyuan Qing buyao Wuru Zhongguoren, [Please do not humiliate Chinese, the Pro-Hong Kong Independence Legislator]. *On.cc*. Retrieved from: https://hk.on.cc/cn/bkn/cnt/commentary/20161020/bkncn-20161020000417343-1020_05411_001_cn.html.
[33] HKU POP (2018, June, 19th). *HKU POP releases survey on Hong Kong people's ethnic identity and ratings of the best fast food restaurants*. Retrieved from: https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1533.html.
[34] Ho, O.H.-k. (2009). China: The Process of Decolonization in the case of Hong Kong. In P. Gassert & M. Klimke (Eds.), *1968-Memories and Legacies of a global revolt* (pp. 79-82). German Historical Institute.
[35] Ho, P. S. Y., Ho, C. K. I., Wong, W. C. W., & Pau, A. M. Y. (2014). *The seven-year struggle: injustices at home for Chinese immigrant women in Hong Kong. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 15*(1), 154-163.
[36] Holland, J., Ramazanoglu, C., Sharpe, C., & Thomson, R. (1998). The male in the head: Young people, hetero-sexuality and power. London: Tufnell Press.
[37] Holmes, J. (2008). *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics*. Harlow, UK: Pearson, Longman.
[38] Hong, Y.-Y., Coleman, J., Chan, G., Wong, R. Y. M., Chiu, C., Hansen, I. G., … Fu, H.-Y. (2004). Predicting Intergroup Bias: The Interactive Effects of Implicit Theory and Social Identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30*(8), 1035–1047.
[39] Hui-Dai, M.T. (2015). *Xinshiye Tongshijiaoyu: Jinrixianggang* [New Horizon Liberal Education Today's Hong Kong]. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Publication Company.
[40] Kung, P. C.L. (2013). The prejudicial portrayal of immigrant families from mainland China in Hong Kong media. In K. B. Chan (Ed.), *International Handbook of Chinese Families* (pp.211-227). New York: Springer.
[41] Lai, P.-S. & Bryam, M. (2006). The Politics of Bilingualism: A Reproduction Analysis of the Policy of Mother Tongue Education in Hong Kong after 1997. In H. Lauder, P. Brown, J-A. Dillabough. &A.H. Halsey (Eds.) *Education, Globalization & Social Change* (pp.490-504). Oxford, UK: The Oxford University Press.
[42] Lau, T. C. S. (2018). Hegemony and the politics of education in Hong Kong: from the post-war era to the post-handover era. *Journal of Educational Administration and History*, *50*(4), 241-255.
[43] Lee, K.-m. & Law. K.-y (2014). Colonialism, Sinicization and Ethnic Minorities in Hong Kong: Social exclusion and barely citizenship. In N.Vasu, Y. Chin & K.-y. Law (Eds.), *Nations, National Narratives and Communities in the Asia-Pacific* (pp. 111-141). London: Routledge.

[44] Li, M. (2016). Pluralistic ignorance in Sino-Hong Kong conflicts: the perception of mainland Chinese people living in Hong Kong. *Chinese Journal of Communication, 9*(2), 153-172.
[45] Loomba, A. (1998). *Colonialism/Postcolonialism.* Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
[46] Lowe, J. & Tsang, E.Y.-h (2017). Disunited in ethnicity: the racialization of Chinese Mainlanders in Hong Kong. *Patterns of Prejudice, 51*(2), 137-158.
[47] [47] Luk, B. H. K. (1991). Chinese culture in the Hong Kong curriculum: heritage and colonialism. *Comparative Education Review*, *35*(4), 650-668.
[48] Marcuse, H. (1991). *One Dimensional Man*. London: Routledge.
[49] Michael, A. W., & Christian-Smith, L. (1991). *The Politics of The Textbook*, Routledge, London--New York.
[50] Mizuoka, F. (2014). Contriving 'laissez-faire': Conceptualising the British colonial rule of Hong Kong. *City, Culture and Society, 5*, 23-32.
[51] Myers, D.G. & Spencer, S.J. (2005). Prejudice: Disliking Others. In D.G. Myers (Ed.), *Social Psychology* (pp. 331-377). Boston: McGraw Hill.
[52] Oxfam (2018). *Hong Kong Inequality Report.* Retrieve from: https://www.oxfam.org.hk/content/98/content_38422en.pdf.
[53] People's Daily (2019, Sep.13th). Xianggang Tongshi Jiaoyu Shishihou jianshil [It is time to review the liberal Education of Hong Kong]. Retrieved from: https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1644565059357914203&wfr=spider&for=pc.
[54] Pierson, H. (1992). Cantonese, English, or Putonghua-Unresolved Communicative Issue in Hong Kong's Future. In G.A. Postiglione (Ed.), *Education and Society in Hong Kong* (pp.183-2020). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[55] Schubert, J. D. (2008). Suffering/Symbolic Violence. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts* (pp. 183-198). Durham, UK: ACUMEN.
[56] Singh, I. (1999). Language and Ethnicity. In L. Thomas & S. Wareing (Eds.), *Language, Society and Power: An Introduction* (pp. 83-97). London: Routledge.
[57] Speakout (2019, Jan, 17th). *Guoxing Mao Meng Jing! Mu Zhun Ren Jiang Putonghua?* [Awaking Mao Meng Jing! Forbidding others speaking Putonghua?] Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJ0Sg2PAcSo.
[58] Squire, C., Davis, M., Esin, C., Andrews, M., Harrison, B., Hyden, L.-C., & Hyden, M. (2014). *What is narrative research?* London: Bloomsbury.
[59] Sylvester, C. (2017). Post-colonialism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens (Eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (pp.174-188). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
[60] Tang, J.T.H. (1994). World War to Cold War: Hong Kong's Future and Anglo-Chinese Interaction, 1941-55. In M.K. Chan (Ed.), *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992* (pp. 107-129). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[61] The World Bank (2012). *GDP per Capita (Current US$).* Retrieve from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?display=defaul.
[62] Thomas, L. (1999). Attitudes to Language. In L. Thomas & S. Wareing (Eds.), *Language, Society and Power: An Introduction* (pp. 173-188). London: Routledge.
[63] Thompson, J.B. (1991). Editor's Introduction. In P. Bourdieu. & J.B. Thompson (Eds.), *Language and Symbolic Power* (pp. 1-31). Cambridge: Polity Press.
[64] Thompson, P. (2008). Field. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts* (pp. 67-81). Durham, UK: ACUMEN.
[65] Thornborrow, J. (1999). Language and Identity. In L. Thomas & S. Wareing (Eds.), *Language, Society and Power: An Introduction* (pp. 135-149). London: Routledge.
[66] Tsai, J.-f. (1994). From Antiforeignism to Popular Nationalism: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1839-1911. In M.K. Chan (Ed.), *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992,* (pp. 9-25). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[67] Turner, J.C. (1984). Social identification and psychological group formation. In H. Taifel (Ed.), *The Social dimensions: European developments in social psychology* (p. 351). London: Cambridge University Press.
[68] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2011). *Human Development Report 2011.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
[69] United Nations Human Settlement Programme (2008). *States of the World's Cities 2008/2009:*

Harmonious cities. London: Earthscan.
[70] Wang, C. (2006). Locating Hong Kong in the global networks of professional migrants. *The Journal of Comparative Asian Development, 5*(2), 329-344.
[71] Wang, D.J. (2014). Guanhua, Guoyu and Putonghua: Politics and the Modification of Standard Language in Modern China. *Academic Monthly, 46(2)*, 155-170.
[72] Wang, L., & Kirkpatrick, A. (2015). Trilingual education in Hong Kong primary schools: an overview. *Multilingual Education, 5(1)*, 1-26.
[73] Wang, L.X. & Kirkpatrick, A. (2018). Students' and parents' perceptions of trilingual education in Hong Kong primary schools. *International Journal of Multilingualism, Online First*, 1-18.
[74] Wong, A.D. (2016). On the Iconization of Simplified Chinese. *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 26*(2), 184-203.
[75] Wong, T. H. (2005). Comparing state hegemonies: Chinese universities in postwar Singapore and Hong Kong. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, *26*(2), 199-218.
[76] Wong, T. H. (2012). De-Universalizing Hegemonies: Chinese School Policies in Postwar Singapore and Hong Kong. *Multicultural Education Review*, *4*(1), 90-118.=
[77] Wong, T. H. (2017). *Nine Lectures on Critical Sociology of Education*. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China).
[78] Xiaosi (2015). *Xianggang Wenxue Sanbu*, [Walking in the Literature of Hong Kong]. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Translation Publishing House.
[79] Ye, B. H., Qiu, H. Z., & Yuen, P. P. (2011). Motivations and experiences of Mainland Chinese medical tourists in Hong Kong. *Tourism Management, 32*(5), 1125-1127.
[80] Yip, K.Y. (2013, April, 19th). *Xiang gang Zhimindi Jiaoyu*. [Education in Colony Hong Kong]. Spark. Retrieved from: https://sparkpost.wordpress.com/2013/04/19/colonial-education/.
[81] Young, J.D. (1994). The Building Years: Maintaining a China-Hong Kong- Britain Equilibrium, 1950-71. In M.K. Chan (Ed.), *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992,* (pp. 131-147). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[82] Yu, F.-L.T. & Kwan, D.S. (2017). Social Construction of National Reality: Chinese Consciousness versusn Hong Kong Conciousness. *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal. 3(2),* 657-686.
[83] Zhang, J. J., Wong, P. P. Y., & Lai, P. C. (2018). A geographic analysis of hosts' irritation levels towards mainland Chinese cross-border day-trippers. *Tourism Management, 68*, 367-374.
[84] Zhang, X.D. & Jing, F.Z. (2011). Qingmo minchu yuyan Biange zhong de guojia yishi. [The sense of nation in the language reform at the interchange between late Qing Dynasty and the start of the Republic of China]. *Shehui Kexue Luntan, 8*, 48-57.